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One of the characteristic  functions of modern  government  is to adminis-
ter declarations  of attachment. Many of these declarations are compulsory,
and  they  span  a  wide  range.  In  order  to  receive  some  social  benefit-a
license,  citizenship,  education,  employment,  a right  to  cohabit-one  must
declare  one's  allegiance  to  a  person  or entity.  Declarations  of attachment
are  often  backed  by  the  force  of law.  Membership  in  private  organiza-
tions,  including  fraternities,  religious  groups,  and clubs,  may  also  be  con-
ditioned  on  compliance  with  requirements  of this  sort.
Compulsory  oaths  have  been  a  prominent  source  of controversy  in  the
latter  half of the  twentieth century.  Consider,  for example,  recent  debates
over the pledge of allegiance,  loyalty oaths, the marriage  vow,  and oaths of
citizenship  for  new  Americans.  Civil  libertarians  have  criticized  compul-
sory  declarations  in  some  or all of these  settings  on  the ground  that  they
impose  requirements  of  uniformity  and  obedience  that  are  inconsistent
with  important  principles  of pluralism and  individual  freedom.  Defenders
of  compulsory  declarations  respond  that  oaths  serve  important  unifying,
educative,  and  even  celebratory  functions,  inculcating  in  participants  a
sense  of the  solemnity  and importance  of such central  institutions  as  citi-
zenship  and  marriage.  In this  view, otherwise  plausible  principles of free-
dom  and  pluralism  should  not  be  permitted  to  override  the  legitimate
functions  performed  by compulsory  oaths.  Indeed,  freedom  and pluralism
may  ultimately  depend  on  the  social  cohesion  brought  about  by  institu-
tions  that  perform  precisely  those  functions.
My  goal  in  this  essay  is  to explore  the  diverse  social  functions  of com-
pulsory  declarations  of  attachment.  The  treatment  will  be  tentative  and
speculative;  it  will  also  be  largely  descriptive  rather  than  normative.  I
want  to  provide  some  preliminary  answers  to  the  following  questions:
What  social  tasks  do  compulsory  declarations  carry  out?  To  what
problems  and  needs,  and  to  whose  problems  and  needs,  are  they  an  at-
tempted  response?
*  This  essay  is  a revised  version  of a presentation  at  the  conference  on  "Language,  Law,  and
Compulsion,"  sponsored  by the  Yale Journal of Law &  the Humanities. I  am  grateful to  Lisa Rud-
dick  for  helpful  comments  and  to  Marc  J.  Porosoff and  D.  Gordon  Smith  for  valuable  research
assistance.
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In answering  these  questions,  I  make  three  basic  claims.  The  first  and
perhaps  not  entirely  surprising  claim  is  that compulsory  oaths  are  often
designed to produce  social  unity by denying or delegitimating the existence
of heterogeneity.  Here  the  purpose  of oaths  is  to negate  or  even  to  erase
dissensus  and  difference.  Compulsory  oaths  often  arise  when  the  legiti-
macy  of certain  forms  of  dissensus  is  producing  significant  social  stress,
and  it  is  under  such  conditions  that  compulsory  oaths  become  especially
controversial.
At the  same  time, compulsory  declarations  of  attachment  represent  an
attempt  to  constitute  a  tradition,  one  that  extends  across  both  time  and
geography.  For some  people,  it  is important  that the tradition  can  be char-
acterized  as  unitary, substantive,  and  praiseworthy.  For others,  of course,
the  tradition  will  be  pluralistic  or  highly  contestable;  and  it  is  for  this
reason  that  they  will  find  compulsory  oaths  objectionable.
Ironically,  however,  the very  existence of compulsory  oaths,  and the  in-
sistence  on  their  public  declaration,  reveal  that  the  fact  to  which  they  at-
test  (unity,  "indivisible,"  "under  God,"  or  "with  liberty  and justice  for
all")  is  a matter  of sharp contention,  or  even  an untruth.  The fact  that  it
is  necessary  to attest to the  relevant claim  demonstrates  that there is  social
dissensus  about  it.  When  the  facts  can  be  taken  for  granted,  they  are  in-
visible,  and  there  is  no  need  to  ensure  that  people  declare  their  commit-
ment  to  them.  In this  respect,  the  terms in  compulsory  oaths  belong  in  a
large  category  of  words  and  phrases  that  are  said  precisely  because  they
are  quite  plausibly  false, or,  to  put  it  more  cautiously,  because  they  have
been  drawn  into  social  question  both  normatively  and  descriptively.'
My  second  proposition  is that compulsory  oaths of a different  sort oper-
ate to disturb rather than  to create  social  unity,  by asserting and legitimat-
ing  the  existence  of  heterogeneity.  Here  the  oath  represents  an  explicit
recognition  of the  overlooked or  even  suppressed  fact  of dissensus,  or of a
deviant  tradition or  set  of connections.  In  cases  like  this,  the  alliance  rec-
ognized  and  constituted  by  the compulsory  oath  runs counter  to and  per-
haps  threatens  the  more  general  tradition.
My  third  proposition  is  that  compulsory  oaths,  and  the  deep  feelings
that  they  tend  to  call  up,  are  a  response  to  three  different  but  related
problems  of narrative  continuity  across  space  and  time.  These  problems
implicate  closely  related  issues  involving  both  human  mortality  and  the
existence  and meaning  of social  traditions:  continuity within  a community
of living  people,  continuity  with the past and  future, and continuity  across
a lifetime.  All  of these  kinds of continuity are  fragile.  An important  func-
tion  of compulsory  declarations  is  to help  establish  them.
1.  It  would  be  most  useful  to  have  a term  to  describe  words  that are  said  precisely  because  they
are  false,  or  because  their  truth  is  in  question.  Conventions  sometimes  described  as  "social
skills"-statements of affection,  connection,  comfort,  or  lack of  offense-provide many  examples.
[Vol.  2:  101
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I  begin  with  a  simple  proposition,  intended  as  a  rough  and  perhaps
uncontroversial  statement  about  the problem.  Compulsory  declarations  of
attachment-most  conspicuously  in  the  context  of a declaration  of attach-
ment  to a  state  or  country-are  characteristically  a  response  to the  prob-
lem  of  social  heterogeneity.  It  is  in  the  face  of  heterogeneity  that  such
declarations  frequently  arise,  and  declarations  tend  to  become  especially
important  when social heterogeneity  is causing  social stress.2  In particular,
the  stress  tends  to  be  produced  by  the presence  of a group  (Communists,
Southern  rebels during and  after the Civil War, racial  or religious minori-
ties,  heretics  of  various  sorts)  whose  existence,  self-understanding,  and
substantive  claims  threaten  the  stability,  meaning,  value, and  existence  of
a  unified  or  unitary  community  or  tradition.  Declarations  become  most
controversial  as  a  normative  matter  in  the  face  of  social  heterogeneity.'
From  these  points  it  does  not  merely  follow  that  compulsory  declara-
tions  serve  to  create  categories  of insiders  and  outsiders,  or  the  excluded
and  the  included.  That  is true  and  important,  but  the point  is  somewhat
broader.  Compulsory  declarations,  and  the cultural  symbols that  they  re-
inforce,  are  often  used  to prevent,  eliminate,  or delegitimate  social  hetero-
geneity,  which  is  itself causing  serious  difficulties.  These  difficulties  tend
to  be  emphasized  by  groups  whose  position  and  (perhaps  even  more  im-
portant)  self-conception  are  threatened  by  recent  social  movements.
It  follows  from  this  that  it  is  necessary  to  establish  the  substantive
points  in  compulsory  oaths  only  when  those  points  have  already  been
proved  in  some sense  false.  No pledge  of allegiance  is  necessary  in  a  fully
unified  country;  no  loyalty  oath  is  required  when  loyalty  is  not  in  ques-
tion;  marriage vows are unnecessary  when  fidelity  (among the many other
things  associated  with  such  vows)  is  a matter  of course.  The insistence  on
the  public  declaration  reveals  that  its  contrary  is  visible,  thinkable,  or a
live  option.  The  statement  contained  in  the  oath  cannot  be  taken  for
granted or assumed  to be part of the natural  order. It  is necessary  to work
actively  on  its  behalf.
In  this respect,  compulsory declarations of attachment have  many of the
features  of  manners,  conventions  about  politeness,  and  rituals  generally.
These  are  often  adhered  to  most  steadfastly  among  strangers,  or  people
2.  See,  e.g.,  H.  Hyman,  Era  of  the  Oath:  Northern  Loyalty  Tests  During  the  Civil  War  and
Reconstruction  (1954);  H. Hyman,  To Try  Men's Souls: Loyalty  Tests in American  History  (1960);
J.  Tyler, Oaths:  Their  Origin,  Nature,  and  History  (1835);  D.  Gardner, The  California Oath  Con-
troversy  (1967).
3.  It  is  uncertain  whether,  in such  circumstances,  oaths  will  serve  their  intended  function.  "Get-
ting there  by pretending  one  is  there already"  is not  always a  sensible strategy  for social  reform,  see J.
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who  are  in  fact  distant  or  estranged.  The  conventions  substitute  for  the
reality.  They  purport  simply  to  state  a  fact  (of,  for  example,  connection,
intimacy,  or  warm  feeling),  but  instead  become  necessary  only  when  the
stated  fact  is  uncertain  or even  false.  Compulsory  declarations  of attach-
ment  are  in  this  sense  also  like  "traditional  values,"  about  which  it  is
necessary  to  speak  only  when  they  have  already  been  seriously  jeopard-
ized.  Here  there  is  a  close  connection  between  compulsory  declarations,
efforts  to  restore  tradition,  and  the  recent  movement  to  have  English  de-
clared  as the official  language  of the United  States. In this  sense,  compul-
sory declarations  and  their various  analogues  serve a constitutive function.
The  history  of  compulsory  declarations  offers  many  illustrations.  Loy-
alty oaths,  for  example, have  become  an  issue almost  always  in the face  of
perceived  or  real  social  dissensus.  Both  the  Civil  War  and  the  perceived
Communist  threat in  the 1940s  and 1950s  provided  fertile  ground  for loy-
alty oaths. The loyalty oath is a conspicuous  effort  to overcome,  erase, and
delegitimate  heterogeneity  and  dissent.4
The  pledge  of  allegiance  has  a similar  history.  The  pledge  came  into
the public  schools  in the  1890s,  and  it was  conspicuously  an outgrowth  of
some  of  the  stresses  of  the  Civil  War.  It  was  important,  for  example,  to
use  the  word  "indivisible"  only  because  the  question  whether  or  not  the
country  was  divisible  had  recently  been  drawn  into  doubt  and  could  no
longer be  taken for granted. Even more strikingly,  the words "under  God"
were inserted  into the pledge  of allegiance  in  1954  as  a response  (in  part)
to  the  recognition  of  social  dissensus  on  precisely  that  point-dissensus
that was to culminate in Supreme Court cases eliminating prayer from  the
public  school  classroom.5  In  the  early  1950s,  there  had  been  increasing
social  recognition  and  legitimation  of doubt  about  the  existence  of  God.
This  phenomenon-together  with  the  Cold  War  and  McCarthy-
ism-helped  spur the "under  God"  amendment  to  the pledge. The  history
shows,  in  short,  that  the words  "under  God"  and  "indivisible"  were  both
attempted  erasures  of  forms  of  social  heterogeneity.
Most  recently,  political  discussion  of Willie  Horton,  a  black  man  who
raped  a  white  woman  during  a  furlough  from  prison,  and  the  pledge  of
allegiance-the  two  dominant  symbols  in  the  1988  presidential  cam-
paign-can  be  understood  in  similar terms.  The  fact  that  the Bush  cam-
paign  used  a  single  phrase  to  unite  these  symbols-"pledges  and  fur-
loughs"-reveals that it was  no accident  that the two emerged  at the same
time.  Both  of these  symbols  were  a straightforward  and  direct response  to
some  of the stresses caused  by the  1960s.  The outbreak  of nationalism and
patriotism  in the early  1980s,  and the controversy  over  flag-burning  in the
4.  See  the  detailed  treatment  in  H.  Hyman,  To  Try  Men's  Souls:  Loyalty  Tests  in  American
History  (1960).
5.  Engel  v. Vitale,  370  U.S.  421  (1962);  School  Dist.  v.  Schempp,  374  U.S.  203  (1963).
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late  1980s,  were similar phenomena.  Those stresses grew  out of the  legiti-
mation  and  prominence  of  heterogeneous  groups-raising  issues  of  race,
gender  roles,  sexual  orientation,  and  so  forth-that  questioned  the  exis-
tence  of  a unitary  or defensible  American  tradition.  Both  the Horton  fur-
lough  and  the  Democratic  ambivalence  about  compulsory  flag  salutes
could  serve  to  unify  voters  against  people  who  seemed  to symbolize  sym-
pathy  or  identification  with the outsiders  of  the  1960s.  The otherwise  in-
explicable  and  indeed  startling use  of the  pledge of allegiance  as  a  major
issue  in  a  national  presidential  campaign  can  only  be  understood  against
this background.  Here  the  compulsory  oath  serves  to assert  the existence
of social  homogeneity,  organized  around  a  well-defined  and  unitary  tradi-
tion  that  is  worthy  of  respect  or  even  reverence.
My  basic  point  thus  far-that  compulsory  declarations  of  attachment
are  an attempt  to provide  a statement of unity when  there  is  in fact  heter-
ogeneity,  and  become  necessary  only  when  the  statement  is  in  an  impor-
tant sense false-is  confirmed  not  only  by  practice,  but  also  by the  oddity
of the phraseology  in some  of the oaths  themselves. Consider the  pledge  of
allegiance.  The  words  "with  liberty  and justice  for  all"  are a  prominent
part  of the pledge;  it  is not  clear whether  the words  are meant  to refer  to
an  aspiration  or to  an  actual  fact  about the  status quo.  In  the structure  of
the  sentence,  the  words  sound  like  a  statement  about  reality,  as  if  the
country  is  already  one  in  which  the  goal  of  liberty  and justice  for  all  is
realized.  In  pledging  allegiance,  then,  one  is not just pledging  attachment,
but  also  declaring  one's  belief  in  a  particular,  substantive,  controversial
conception  about  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  which  one  is  becoming  at-
tached-a  conception  that  is  shared,  or  to  be  made  to  be  shared,  by  all
citizens.  The  reality-constituting  aspect  of  the  pledge  is  smuggled  in
through  a  mere  prepositional  phrase  at  the  conclusion;  what  appears  on
the surface  to be  a  simple  statement  of attachment  thus  serves  to  impose  a
particular  view  about  the  status  quo.
I  should  emphasize  that  an  attempted  act  of  social  unification  always
entails  a  kind  of delegitimation  or  even  erasure  of certain  kinds  of inde-
pendence.  Marriage is  a particular example,  and  the process  occurs  differ-
ently  for  men and  women.  In  most of  its  historical  manifestations, the  act
of marriage  merges  the  wife  with  the  husband  but  not  quite  vice  versa
(she  says  "obey,"  he  does  not; the  man and  woman  are traditionally  pro-
nounced  "man  and  wife";  she  loses  her  name  and  her  property,  he  does
not; other aspects of the ceremony  and its aftermath make  the same point).
In  religious  oaths,  unification  under  a divine  order  entails  a kind of oblit-
eration  of the separate  self. Something  quite similar  is  at work  in oaths of
attachment  to a  nation.  All  this  accounts  for  the  deep,  sometimes  primal
feelings  called up  by  the ceremonies,that  accompany  oaths  of attachment.
1990]
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I  have  not yet  explored the  question  why  it  is  necessary  to have  people
say  the words  that  are  contained  in  oaths of attachment.  One of the  most
distinctive  features  of  a  compulsory  declaration  of  attachment  is  that
someone  is  being  asked to  say something-a  perhaps jarring  phenomenon
in  a  liberal  republic  that  prizes  voluntarism.  There  are  two  possible  ac-
counts here.  On  one  view,  loyalty  oaths  are in  fact  closely  connected  with
the  voluntaristic  aspects  of  the  liberal  tradition.  Declarations  of  attach-
ment  can  be  seen  as  part  of an  effort  to link  political  obligation  with the
active  consent  of  the  governed.6  But  Nietzsche  offers  a  competing  and
bleaker  perspective  on this development,  seeing  oaths as  a  form of compul-
sion  amounting  to  an  exercise  in  social  control.  On  Nietzsche's  account,
compulsory  oaths  amount  to a  kind of physical  inscription  on the  body  of
the  citizen.'
However  this  may  be,  oaths  are  frequently  parts  of public  ceremonies
in which  people are  required  to  make  the  relevant  commitments  with  or
before  a large  audience. The  act of saying  something  in  public operates in
practice  as  a  kind  of precommitment  device.  One  who has  made  a public
declaration  is  probably  unlikely  to violate  it, even  in  private moments.'  In
this respect,  an oath operates  as  a  peculiarly  public  statement  of commit-
ment,  one  that exerts  a powerful  hold on  participants.  This  outcome  may
be partly  a product  of notions  of honor and  partly a function  of the  cogni-
tive  dissonance  produced  by  saying  something  (especially  in  public)  and
then  doing  something else.  A  violation  of a public oath  seems  a  distinctive
kind of betrayal. But  the explanation  probably  goes  deeper.  The  religious
connotations  of seemingly  secular oaths play  a  role  in giving  compliance  a
kind  of moral  urgency.  There  remains  a  connection  of the  sacred  and the
divine with  public  declarations,  and  a  sense of sacrilege  in their violation,
even  in  their  most  secular  forms.9
C
The  two  flag  salute  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court-Gobitis°  and
Barnette"  -represent  the classic  encounters between  the  legal  system  and
oaths of  attachment."  Both  cases  presented  the  question  whether  a  state
could compel Jehovah's  Witnesses to say  the  pledge of allegiance  notwith-
6.  See  D.  Herzog,  Happy  Slaves  186-93  (1989).
7.  See  F.  Nietzsche,  The  Genealogy of Morals (1887),  in The  Birth of Tragedy and The Geneal-
ogy  of  Morals  192-98  (F. Golffing  trans.  1956).
8.  See  J.  Elster, Ulysses  and  the  Sirens  (1981)  (discussing  precommitment  strategies).
9.  Compare  the discussion of the  Constitution  as  a kind  of civil  religion  in  S. Levinson,  Constitu-
tional  Faith  (1988).
10.  Minersville  School  Dist.  v. Gobitis,  310  U.S.  586  (1940).
11.  West  Virginia  State  Bd.  of  Educ.  v. Barnette,  319  U.S.  624  (1943).
12.  Loyalty  oaths also were at issue  in  Adler v. Board  of Educ.,  342 U.S.  485 (1952);  Elfbrandt v.
Russell,  384  U.S.  11  (1966);  Keyishian  v. Board  of Regents,  385  U.S.  589  (1967).
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standing  their religious objections.  In  both  cases,  then,  a subgroup of  soci-
ety  sought  to exempt itself from an  attempt  to inculcate  a  form  of national
unity.  In  Gobitis, Justice  Frankfurter  wrote  the  opinion  for  the  Court,
explaining  that  a  compulsory  daily  salute  to  the  American  flag  did  not
violate  the Constitution. Justice  Frankfurter  defended  the  compulsory  flag
salute  as  a means  of "promot[ing]  national  cohesion.  We  are  dealing,"  he
continued,
with  an  interest  inferior  to  none  in  the  hierarchy  of  legal  values.
National  unity  is  the  basis  of  national  security.  . . .The  ultimate
foundation  of a  free  society  is  the  binding  tie  of cohesive  sentiment.
Such  a  sentiment  is  fostered  by  all  those  agencies  of  the  mind  and
spirit  which may  serve  to gather up  the traditions of  a  people,  trans-
mit them  from  generation  to generation,  and thereby  create that con-
tinuity  of  a  treasured  common  life  which  constitutes  a  civilization.
We  live  by  symbols.  The  flag  is  the  symbol  of our  national  unity,
transcending  all  internal  differences,  however  large,  within  the
framework  of the  Constitution. 3
According  to  Justice  Frankfurter,  the  Court should  not  disparage  gov-
ernment  efforts  to  "[i]nculcat[e]  those  almost  unconscious  feelings,  which
bind  men  together  in  comprehending  loyalty."" '
In  this opinion,  one finds  an  unambiguous  depiction  of the compulsory
declaration  of attachment  as  a  response  to  the  problem  of  heterogeneity.
Indeed,  Gobitis might  well  be  taken  as  the  only  Supreme  Court  opinion
powerfully  resonant  of  Rousseau:  intermediate  organizations,  even  reli-
gious  ones,  are  seen  as  threats  to  national  unity.  Here,  too,  one  can  see
how an oath or pledge is  valued as a means of creating  a unitary tradition,
extending  across  both  time and  space.
But  in  spite  of  these  straightforward  features,  Justice  Frankfurter's
opinion has  a distinctly  tortured quality.  The term "unconscious feelings"
fits at best  awkwardly  with  his  more rationalistic  reference  to the citizens'
"comprehending  loyalty."  The  word  "comprehending"  is quite jarring in
the  context  of Justice  Frankfurter's  tribute  to  the anti-rationalistic,  spiri-
tual  character  of patriotism.  It was  probably  necessary  for him  to  use the
word  "comprehending"  because  of  the  otherwise  extremely  unpalatable
and  potentially  totalitarian  connotations  of the  passage-written  in  1940,
when  countries with whom  the United  States was about to enter hostilities
had  called up national  feelings  through  self-conscious  methods of inculcat-
ing  patriotic  fervor.  Notable,  too,  is Justice  Frankfurter's  uncharacteristic
emphasis  on  "feelings"  throughout  this  opinion,  as  well  as  the opinion's
heavily  Burkean  flavor.
13.  310  U.S.  at  595-96.
14.  Id.  at  600.
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In  Barnette, written just  three  years  after  Gobitis, the  Supreme  Court
changed  its  mind,  offering  a  powerful  argument  on  behalf  of individual
conscience  even  against  national  efforts  to  promote  cohesion  and  unity.
The  Court's  language  appeared  to  be  a  self-conscious  response  to  the
spectacle  provided  by  American  adversaries  in  World  War  II:  "Those
who begin  coercive elimination  of dissent soon  find themselves  exterminat-
ing  dissenters.  Compulsory  unification  of opinion  achieves  only  the  una-
nimity  of  the graveyard.  It  seems  trite  but  necessary  to  say  that  the First
Amendment  to  our  Constitution  was  designed  to  avoid  these  ends  by
avoiding  these  beginnings,"
Justice  Frankfurter's  dissenting opinion amounts  to  a  self-conscious  en-
dorsement  of the  virtues  of  ensuring  national  attachments  that  transcend
ties  to  intermediate  organizations,  including  religious  groups.  In  an  ex-
traordinary  personal  statement,  Frankfurter  wrote,
One who  belongs  to the most vilified  and persecuted  minority  in  his-
tory  is  not  likely  to  be  insensible  to the  freedoms  guaranteed  by  our
Constitution.  . . .But  as judges  we  are  neither  Jew  nor  Gentile,
neither Catholic nor  agnostic. We  owe equal  attachment  to the  Con-
stitution  and  are  equally  bound  by  our judicial  obligations  whether
we derive our citizenship  from the earliest or the latest immigrants  to
these  shores.'
What  is  most  notable  here  is  that in  this formulation,  social  equality  is
depicted  as  a  result  of disinterest,  defined  as the  absence of  ties  to groups
situated  between  the  individual and  the nation.  (Consider the  reference  to
the  diverse times  of  arrival  in  this country,  a notorious  source of discrimi-
nation  against Jews and others.)  In Barnette, Justice Frankfurter-an  as-
similated  Jew,  the  only  dissenter  in  the  case,  the  author  of  Gobitis, the
only Jew  on the Court  and indeed  only the second  in  its history-voted  to
uphold the compulsory  flag  salute  statute precisely  because of the  simulta-
neous risks to equality and cohesion  that, in his view,  are  posed by hetero-
geneity.  On this account,  assimilation  into  the nation  as  a whole,  and  the
weakening  of other forms  of membership,  are guarantors  of equality  and
powerful  protection  against  social  exclusion.  Here  it  is  the  Justice  for
whom social  unity is  not quite  a fact,  and hardly  part of the natural  order,
who  insists  that  the  oath  is  permissible.
II
Thus  far  I  have  suggested  that  compulsory  declarations  of  attachment
can  be  understood  as  a  response  to  the  problem  of  social  heterogeneity
through  an  attempted  delegitimation  or  erasure  of difference  and  dissent.
15.  319  U.S.  at  641.
16.  Id.  at 646-47.
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But  sometimes  compulsory  declarations  are  a  product  of something  alto-
gether  different:  the  desire  to  bring  about  (or explicitly  to  recognize)  dif-
ferentiation  by  creating  a  subcommunity,  one  that  stands  in  opposition  to
the  dominant  group.  In  such  cases,  compulsory  declarations  establish  or
acknowledge  heterogeneity  in  the  face  of what  seems  to  be  stifling social
cohesion.  Here  the  goal  is  not  to  erase  social  difference,  but  to  make  it
visible.
The  clearest  examples  here  involve  the  creation  and  setting off  of sub-
groups  (for  example,  fraternal  orders,  labor  unions,  racial  or  women's
groups, 17  and  religious  organizations)  so  as  to  establish  unified,  substan-
tively  oriented  entities  that  were  formerly  nonexistent,  delegitimated,  or
erased  by their  submergence  within  a loosely  unified,  apparently  homoge-
neous  culture.  Sometimes  these groups impose a requirement  of an oath of
allegiance.  The taking  of the oath  is  designed  as  a foundational  event,  one
that  signals  the  creation  or  emergence  of  an  independent  new  entity.  In
this  respect  it  resembles  other ceremonies  serving broadly  analogous  func-
tions,  including  those  involving  both  birth  and  death.
In  cases of this sort,  the oath  becomes  necessary  or useful  not when  and
because  it  is  a  lie,  but  when  and  because  it  is  an  overlooked  and  sup-
pressed  truth. The  oath  serves  as  a  mechanism  both  to  legitimate  and  to
constitute  difference  and  heterogeneity.  The  compulsory  declaration  de-
marcates  separation  rather  than  unification. 8
This point suggests  that the declaration  of attachment raises  asymmetri-
cal  considerations  in  different  settings.  Sometimes  a  compulsory  declara-
tion  is  an  effort  to  suppress  differences  on  the  part  of  the  socially
marginalized  or  despised  (Communists,  immigrants,  atheists,  members  of
dissident  religious organizations,  Southern  rebels, and  so forth);  sometimes
it  is  an  effort  to  recognize  or legitimate  differences  on  their part.  Indeed,
an  oath might  be  required  in  an  effort  to recognize  or  reestablish  an  old
tradition  whose  existence  and  meaning  are  in jeopardy.  Alternatively,  it
might  represent  an  effort  to recognize  and create a  new tradition that is a
self-conscious  deviation  from  the  past.
In some  cases,  then, oaths serve to  conceal  the fact  of heterogeneity,  and
by  virtue of their  necessity  reveal  that social unity  is fragile or a  lie; but in
other cases  they  disclose  the  previously  invisible  but  true  fact  of heteroge-
neity,  one  that  had  been  suppressed  by  the  existence  of  social  silence.  In
these  latter  cases  the  oath  brings  out  into  the open  a  set  of alliances  and
enmities  that  had  previously  been  overlooked.  In  the  former  cases,  the
17.  Notably, however,  oaths  do not  appear to be  a  source  of solidarity  among  women's  groups;  I
have  been  able  to  find  no  examples  of  oath-making  among  such  groups  after  an  admittedly  casual
survey.  The fact-if it  is a fact-that  oaths  characterize male  but  not  female groups may  have  inter-
esting  implications for  oaths  in  general;  I  cannot  discuss  them  in  this  space.
18.  In one sense  this is  true of the  oath  in  the  national context  as  well.  Unification of  the  nation
means  a setting  off of  the  nation  from  other  entities and  people.
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oath  often  has  a  defensive,  preventative  character;  in  the  latter,  the
celebratory,  joyous,  even  explosive  functions  of  the  oath  and  its  various
surrogates  are  especially  conspicuous.
III
As  an  effort  to  create  a  kind  of  unity  across  heterogeneous  groups  in
society,  compulsory  declarations  are  connected  to  familiar  notions  of  citi-
zenship  and  membership.  Hegel,  for example,  wrote  that in  a pluralistic
nation,  it  is  necessary  to  have a  king.1"  In Hegel's  conception,  the  king  is
entirely  or  almost  entirely  nonsubstantive.  He  is  a  symbol  of  unity  that
cuts across  separateness  and differentiation;  and he symbolizes unity  itself,
not  anything  in  particular.  In  this  respect,  the  king  serves  some  of  the
same  functions  as  the  flag.  (One  can  in  this  regard  distinguish  between
oaths  that  have  substantive  functions  and  those  that  do  not.)
In  these  circumstances,  the  compulsory  declaration  connects  past,  pre-
sent,  and  future,  and  also  unites  people  separated  in  geographical  terms.
There is  both a "vertical"  component  in  the  attempt at linkage,  extending
over  time,  and  a "horizontal"  component,  extending  across  space.  (Acts  of
altruism-encompassing  both  duty  and  fellow-feeling2-are  often  pro-
duced or  fueled  by perceptions  of linkage  of this  sort.)  Through  the  effort
to  unite  past,  present,  and  future,  the  compulsory  declaration  is  closely
connected  with  the  problem  of human  mortality.  The  individual  who  de-
clares attachment  obtains  an alliance with  a community  extending far  into
the  future-all  the more  so  with oaths  that have  theological  connotations.
The most  striking  example of the  temporal  extension  of oaths  is  that of
the  Israeli  soldiers  who, upon entering  the  Army,  must walk  to the top  of
Mount Masada-where  Jews  had committed  suicide  so  as  to  avoid  being
slaughtered  by  the  Romans-and  give  an  oath  of  allegiance.  In  this  re-
spect,  oaths  connect  the  viewer, and  speaker  with  those  who  have  come
before  and  those  who  will  come  after.  Here  one  can  see  the  relationship
between  oath-taking  and  membership  in  a  community  that  extends  over
time.  Moreover,  at least  some  oaths  make  explicit  references  to both  birth
and  death.
But the work  of unification  in the  face of heterogeneity  is  not just inter-
personal;  it is intrapersonal  as  well.  Symbols  and  rituals of this sort  have
the  emotional  force  they  do,  not  only  because  they  connect  each  person
with  others  now  living,  and not only  because  they  provide  continuity  with
people  long  dead,  but  also  because  they  help  to  provide  some  continuity
over  a  lifetime.  The  problem  of  intrapersonal  heterogeneity  arises  as  a
result  of the large  number of  possibly different  "selves"  extending  across a
19.  See G.W.F.  Hegel,  The  Philosophy of  Right  180-90  (Knox  trans.  1952); see also Yack,  The
Rationality  of  Hegel's  Concept  of  Monarchy,  74  Am.  Pol.  Sci.  Rev. 709  (1980).
20.  See  Beyond  Self-Interest  Q.  Mansbridge  ed.  forthcoming  1990).
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span  of years.  Oaths of attachment  and similar ceremonies  sometimes  help
provide  a  kind  of  anchor.  In  this  sense  as  well,  the  problem  of  human
mortality  is  very  much  in  the  foreground  here.  The  controversies  intro-
duced  by compulsory  oaths of attachment  might  be  seen  as countless  local
examples  of disputes over  Burkean  understandings  of continuity,  member-
ship,  and  community.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Oaths of attachment  are most naturally  understood  as  a  response  to the
problems  of membership  and citizenship  in  the  context  of social  heteroge-
neity.  Sometimes  the  purpose  of oaths  is  to  delegitimate  heterogeneity  by
asserting  unity. When  this  is so,  the very  existence  of the oath  tends,  iron-
ically,  to confirm  the existence  of the  problem.  Sometimes  the  purpose  of
oaths  is  to  acknowledge,  ratify,  or  create  heterogeneity  by  asserting  that
the  claim  of  unity  is  false.  Here  the  oath  is  an assertion  of  a  previously
unrecognized  truth.
In any  case,  the existence  of a unitary  and  worthy tradition,  connecting
previous  as  well  as  existing  members  of  a  community,  is  the  issue  to
which  oaths of attachments  are  an  attempted  response.  The  conventional
modern  antipathy to oaths of attachment-invoking  liberal  beliefs  in indi-
vidual  immunity  from  communal  ties-tends  to  be  too  cavalier  about  the
various  functions  that  the  oaths  perform.
Compulsory  oaths of attachment  have  a  bad  name  among  many  of us,
and  for  quite  good  reasons;  but  it  would  not  be  easy  to  live  in  a  world
without them,  or at least without  surrogates doing  some of the social  work
that they  do.
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